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CONSENSUS OUTLOOK TODAY
What is the consensus outlook for the U.S.
economy today? Numerous forecasts are in the
public domain, from government and private
sources.1 Direct comparison of these forecasts is
not straightforward, as there are differences among
the variables for which the forecasts are presented,
differences in the forecasting time horizons, and
differences in averaging, with some forecasts
presented on a fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter
basis and others presented on an annual-average
over annual-average basis.
Nevertheless, at present a remarkably uniform
picture from a perusal of these various sources
emerges for the major economic indicators. Real
gross domestic product (GDP) is forecast to grow
in the 4 to 4½ percent range from the fourth quar-
ter of 2003 to the fourth quarter of 2004. Inflation
as measured by the consumer price index (CPI)
is forecast in the 1½ to 2 percent range and as
measured by the GDP chain price index is fore-
cast in the 1 to 1½ percent range over that horizon.
The unemployment rate is forecast to be around
5½ percent by the fourth quarter of 2004.
My colleagues around the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) table are on average
slightly more bullish than the above picture: The
midpoint of the range of forecasts of real GDP
growth included in the Monetary Policy Report
to the Congress submitted two weeks ago is 4½
I
have a simple message today—that anyone
interested in monetary policy should spend
less time on economic forecasts and more
time on implications of forecast surprises.
If you are in the forecasting business, it makes
good sense to write at length about the forecast
and the analysis behind it. For the rest of us, the
forecast provides the baseline for examining the
most important policy issues. The true art of
good monetary policy is in managing forecast
surprises and not in doing the obvious things
implied by the baseline forecast.
I’ll proceed by outlining the consensus out-
look and then will discuss how I view the job of
dealing with surprises. I’ll emphasize that the
key issue is that monetary policy responses to
surprises ought not to be random, but as pre-
dictable as possible. There are some principles
of good responses that make it easier for students
of monetary policy to predict what the Federal
Reserve will do.
Before digging into the substance of my sub-
ject, I want to emphasize that the views I express
do not necessarily reflect official positions of the
Federal Reserve System. I thank my colleagues
at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their
comments—especially Bob Rasche, senior vice
president and director of research, who provided
special assistance. However, I retain full respon-
sibility for errors.
1 A partial list includes Blue Chip Economic Indicators (published each month); Survey of Professional Forecasters (compiled quarterly by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia); Wall Street Journal Forecasting Survey (published early January and July of each year); Congressional
Budget Office, Budget and Economic Outlook (published each February and August); Council of Economic Advisers economic outlook
(published each February in the Economic Report of the President and updated each July); and Federal Reserve System, Monetary Policy
Report to the Congress (published each February and July), containing the economic projections of the Federal Reserve governors and
Reserve Bank presidents.percent for the fourth quarter of 2004 over the
fourth quarter of 2003. The midpoint of the range
of inflation forecasts (measured by the chained
price index for personal consumption expendi-
tures) in that report is 1.13 percent, and the mid-
point of the forecast for the unemployment rate
in the fourth quarter of 2004 is 5.38 percent. I’ll
refer to this forecast as the “FOMC members’ fore-
cast.” The forecast reflects a survey of FOMC
members, but is not an FOMC forecast per se
because the Committee does not debate and vote
on the forecast to make it a Committee forecast
as such. Nor is it the Board of Governors staff
forecast prepared for each FOMC meeting and
reproduced in the Greenbook; the Greenbook is
released with the FOMC meeting transcript only
after a five-year lag.
Those forecasters who risk interest rate fore-
casts (the Wall Street Journal Forecasting Survey,
the Blue Chip Economic Indicators, and the
Congressional Budget Office Economic Outlook)
expect Treasury bill rates around 1.2 percent,
and ten-year Treasury bond rates around 4.6 per-
cent either on an annual average basis or at the
middle of 2004. I should note that FOMC mem-
bers do not make public forecasts of interest rates.
HOW RELIABLE IS THE
CONSENSUS OUTLOOK?
The small dispersion among forecasts today
is not unusual and should not be interpreted as a
measure of likely forecast accuracy. Over the
years, numerous studies have investigated the
forecast accuracy of private forecasters. More
recently several studies have compared the accu-
racy of both the FOMC members’ forecasts and
the Greenbook forecasts with those of private
forecasters. One recent analysis was produced
by William Gavin and Rachel Mandal in the
research department at the Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. Their paper was published last year
in the International Journal of Forecasting.2
Because of the lag in releasing the Greenbook,
this study analyzes the Greenbook forecasting
record up through 1996. The other comparisons
include forecasts through 2001.
The authors compared the Blue Chip fore-
casts, the Greenbook forecasts, and the FOMC
members’ forecasts against a naive, same-change
forecast beginning in 1980 for both real output
growth and inflation. Three different forecasting
horizons were examined: six, twelve, and eight-
een months.3 Not surprisingly, the accuracy of
the forecasts deteriorates as the forecasting hori-
zon is lengthened. For a one-year-ahead forecast,
the root-mean-squared forecast error (a measure
of the dispersion of the forecasts around the real-
ized value) for real output growth is on the order
of 1.4 percentage points for all the three sets of
forecasts considered. The root-mean-squared fore-
cast error for the naive forecast is considerably
larger, on the order of 2.2 percentage points.
Clearly, the forecast accuracy of the forecast-
ers is substantially better than that of the naive
forecast, but still leaves a lot of room for surprises.
To make this point clear in today’s context, if for
convenience we say that the GDP growth forecast
is 4 percent over the four quarters ending 2004:Q4,
then one standard error leaves us with a forecast
band of 3 to 6 percent growth over this period. If
we were to have a 3 percent outcome, everyone
would fear that the recovery is faltering; if we
were to have a 6 percent outcome, the most likely
characterization would be that we have a boom
on our hands.
Moreover, keep in mind that one standard
deviation on either side of the expected value
does not by any means exhaust the range of pos-
sible outcomes. As a rough approximation, one
time out of three, the one-year-ahead forecast of
real output growth will fall outside a range of
plus or minus 1.4 percentage points of the stated
forecast number. Assuming a symmetrical distri-
bution of forecast errors, which seems reasonable,
there is a probability of about 0.16 that real out-
put growth over the next four quarters will exceed
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2 William T. Gavin and Rachel J. Mandal, “Evaluating FOMC Forecasts,” International Journal of Forecasting, 2003, 19(4), pp. 655-67.
3 Details can be found in Tables 4 and 5 of Gavin and Mandal.6 percent and a probability of about 0.16 that
output growth will fall short of 3 percent.
Clearly the range of error associated with the
current state of the forecasting art fails to distin-
guish between a really strong expansion—a
boom—and a faltering recovery. And the accu-
racy of inflation forecasts is not much better. On
a one-year-ahead forecasting horizon, the root-
mean-squared error of inflation forecasts is in
the range of 0.75 to 0.9 percentage points. This
forecasting record is not much better than would
have been achieved with a naive forecasting
model. As with real GDP, there is a significant
probability that the outcome could fall outside
the one-standard-deviation band. And it is also
true that an inflation outcome outside the band
would create considerable concern.
Published forecasts are repeatedly updated
on ever shorter and shorter forecasting horizons.
The results reported by Gavin and Mandal indi-
cate that as the horizon becomes shorter the uncer-
tainty surrounding the forecast realization is
reduced—though, perhaps surprisingly, not by a
particularly large amount. Their analysis suggests
that for real GDP growth the root-mean-squared
forecast error on an eighteen-month horizon is
between 1.5 and 1.9 percentage points while at
a six-month horizon it is reduced to only 1.3 per-
centage points. For inflation, the root-mean-
squared forecast error at the eighteen-month
horizon is between 1.1 and 1.3 percentage points
but is substantially reduced to around 0.5 per-
centage points at a six-month horizon.
As we go through the year, the forecast for
2004 will be updated as results for each quarter
come in. An example of this process is provided
by the monthly Blue Chip consensus forecast for
2003. The initial release of the Blue Chip forecast
for last year was in January 2002; thus, we have
a record of 24 successive Blue Chip forecasts for
2003. The initial forecast was for a year-over-year
growth rate of 3.4 percent. Through the first half
of 2002 the consensus forecast was revised up
slightly, reaching a peak of 3.6 percent in June.
Thereafter the consensus was fairly steadily
revised downward over the next year, reaching a
trough of 2.3 percent in August 2003. The final
forecast, in December 2003, was 3.1 percent,
which is the currently published number for real
growth in 2003 over 2002. The initial release of
the consensus CPI inflation forecast for 2003 over
2002 in January 2002 was 2.4 percent. This fore-
cast changed very little over the following 24
months, increasing to 2.5 percent in mid-2002
and then settling down at 2.3 percent, the CPI
inflation rate that was realized for 2003 over 2002.
The relatively low variability of the consensus
forecast for 2003 masks the heterogeneity among
the individual survey respondents that reflects
the inherent uncertainty of economic forecasts.
In early 2002, the range of forecasts for real growth
in 2003 across the Blue Chip respondents was
2.0 to 6.0 percent. By the beginning of 2003 this
range had narrowed to about 2.5 to 4.5 percent.
Only after the middle of 2003, when data from
six of the eight quarters involved in the compu-
tation of a year-over-year growth rate were avail-
able, did the range of individual forecasts drop
below 1 percentage point.
A similar dispersion is observed among the
individual forecasts of CPI inflation for 2003. At
the beginning of 2002 the range of forecasts was
from less than 1.0 percent to almost 4.5 percent.
By early 2003 this range had narrowed to less
than 1.5 to slightly more than 2.5 percent. It was
only after September 2003 that the range of fore-
casts shrunk to less than 1 percentage point.
SOME EXAMPLES OF FORECAST
SURPRISES
Forecast surprises, or forecast errors, are a
standard part of the policy landscape. It is very
easy to criticize forecasts and extremely difficult
to come up with better forecasts. The fact is that
good forecasters produce state-of-the-art forecasts.
Policymakers must deal with forecast surprises.
What are the sources of those surprises?
The difficulty of forecasting turning points
in economic activity is most significant. What-
ever creates a recession also creates a forecast
surprise. For example, the October 2000 Blue
Chip consensus for real growth over the five
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3quarters ending 2001:Q4 was for a very steady
quarter-to-quarter expansion in real GDP in the
range of 3.3 to 3.6 percent at an annual rate. The
business cycle dating committee of the National
Bureau of Economic Research later dated a cycle
peak in March 2001 and a trough in November
2001. Actual quarter-to-quarter real growth during
this period ranged from –1.3 to 2.1 percent. Thus,
five months before the onset of the 2001 recession,
the Blue Chip consensus forecast missed the
recession completely!
My point here is not to pick on the Blue Chip
respondents. My colleagues on the FOMC had
no greater foresight. In the minutes of the FOMC
meeting in October 2000 we can read that,
“[l]ooking ahead, they [FOMC members] generally
anticipated that the softening in equity prices
and the rise in interest rates that had occurred
earlier in the year would contribute to keeping
growth in demand at a more subdued but still
relatively robust pace.”4
A second noteworthy example is October
2001. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11
attacks, forecasters turned extremely bearish on
the near-term prospects. The Blue Chip consen-
sus for real growth in 2001:Q4 in the October 10,
2001, survey was –1.3 percent, with a range of
forecasts from –3.2 to 0.8 percent. The Blue Chip
respondents were particularly pessimistic about
prospects for the manufacturing sector; the con-
sensus was for growth of –3.1 percent, with a
range from –7.4 to 0.6 percent. We now know
that in 2001:Q4 the economy rebounded to a 2.1
annual rate of growth in real GDP, led by an all-
time record rate of light vehicle sales. Keep in
mind that this GDP growth rate was above the
forecast of every single one of the 50 plus Blue
Chip respondents at the beginning of the quarter.
A third example is the history of real growth
and inflation forecasts in the second half of the
1990s after the now-apparent increase in trend
productivity growth. Consider the midpoint of
the range of forecasts of real growth and inflation
by FOMC members prepared each February for
the four quarters ending in the fourth quarter of
each year from 1996 through 1999. On average
these forecasts underestimated real growth by
2.1 percentage points for these four years. The
range of forecast errors was from 2.4 to 1.9 per-
centage points. The errors were all in the same
direction and all of significant size. During the
same four years the CPI inflation forecast error
averaged 0.0 percent—right on the button. How-
ever the forecast errors for the individual years
ranged from –1.2 to 0.6 percentage points.
The reasons for forecast errors are many. Some
reflect incomplete understanding of how the
economy works, such as the errors in projecting
productivity growth, or consumer behavior right
after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Some reflect unpre-
dictable shocks, such as a sharp change in energy
prices or the 9/11 terrorist attacks themselves.
Some reflect financial disturbances, such as the
1987 stock market crash. Whatever may be the
reasons for forecast errors, they are a fact of life.
THE POLICY SIGNIFICANCE OF
FORECAST UNCERTAINTY
What are the implications of the documented
uncertainty surrounding forecasts of future econ-
omic activity? Some dismiss forecasts altogether
and view them as irrelevant for policy because
their errors are so large. To me, that response is
completely wrong. Instead, policy needs to be
informed by the best guesses incorporated in
forecasts and by knowledge of forecast errors.
Forecast errors create risk, and that risk needs to
be managed as efficiently as possible. And the
surprises that create forecast errors also create
the need for policy changes that cannot be antici-
pated in advance because the surprises cannot
be anticipated.
Given the size of forecast errors, we will fre-
quently observe the economy evolving along a
substantially different path from that portrayed
by consensus forecasts only a short time earlier.
With newly available information, forecasters will
4 Minutes of the FOMC Meeting of October 3, 2000, Federal Reserve Bulletin, January 2001, p. 23.
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4adjust their prognostications, and policymakers,
such as the FOMC, will adjust their view of the
appropriate policy stance. If the revised view of
the appropriate policy stance is sufficiently
changed, policymakers can and should imple-
ment the changes in policy settings, such as the
intended federal funds rate, that they believe are
consistent with the new information.
Such policy actions should be implemented
whether or not they will come as surprises to
market participants and the general public. Here
it is important to be clear about the distinction
between a policy and a policy action. A policy
should be viewed as a rule or response regularity
that links policy actions, such as adjustments in
the intended federal funds rate, to the state of
the world. A policy is like a decision to drive 65
miles per hour; given that policy, a policy action
is the adjustment of the accelerator to maintain
the target speed. If the effects of wind and hills
on speed cannot be anticipated, then neither can
the policy actions of accelerator adjustments. A
good policy requires clarity about policy objec-
tives and as much precision as possible as to how
policy actions will respond to new information
to best achieve the policy objectives.
In the monetary policy context, anticipated
policy actions are naturally tied closely to the
forecast. To maintain the policy of achieving low
and stable inflation, unanticipated policy actions
must often accompany forecast surprises. Should
an inflationary shock hit the economy, for exam-
ple, that shock and an increase in the FOMC’s
target federal funds rate would both be surprises.
On numerous occasions I have stated my view
that the FOMC should communicate its intention
about monetary policy as precisely as possible to
get markets in “synch” with policy. My view
should not be interpreted to imply that the FOMC
can only act after it has “prepared” market partici-
pants for a change in the intended federal funds
rate. There will be times when significant unfore-
seen economic news will be revealed very sud-
denly—events that can be appropriately described
as “shocks.” If, in the judgment of the FOMC,
such news calls for policy actions even though
market participants could not have been fore-
warned of such actions, the FOMC would be
derelict in its responsibilities if it failed to act.
Given the shock, the FOMC’s action ought not to
be a surprise. The real surprise would arise if the
FOMC were to do nothing in the face of a shock
calling for action.
A couple of examples are illustrative. Consider
the Asian debt crisis, the Russian default, and
the collapse of Long Term Capital Management
(LTCM) in August-September 1998. No one fore-
saw this combination of events, nor was the
impact of these events on the liquidity of major
financial markets predictable. At the time of the
FOMC meeting on August 18, 1998, federal funds
futures for contracts as far out as December 1998
were trading within a couple of basis points of
the prevailing 4.50 percent intended funds rate.
Nevertheless, by the conclusion of the FOMC
meeting on November 17, 1998, the intended
funds rate had been reduced in three steps by a
total of 75 basis points, including a cut of 25
basis points at an unscheduled conference call
meeting on October 15.
These rate cuts in the fall of 1998 were a sur-
prise from the vantage point of early August. But
the real surprise would have been if the FOMC
had totally ignored the Russian default and col-
lapse of LTCM. Holding the intended funds rate
constant given the market turmoil would not have
been consistent with the Fed’s responsibility to
contribute to financial stability.
I could walk through numerous other exam-
ples to drive home the point that a key feature of
monetary policy is measured and appropriate
responses to the constant stream of surprises. In
discussions of monetary policy, I would like to
see much more emphasis on appropriate policy
responses to surprises and potential surprises
and much less emphasis on forecasts. An over-
emphasis on consensus forecasts may lead market
participants to a false precision in their views
about the federal funds rate going forward. It is
much more productive to think through the sorts
of things that might happen and the appropriate
response to such events. A careful analysis of
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5risks helps to prepare the mind for dealing with
surprises when they occur. Market participants
and the FOMC should not focus on the predict-
ability of a particular path for the funds rate, but
instead on the predictability of the response of
the FOMC to new information about the economy.
PRINCIPLES OF FOMC
RESPONSES TO “SHOCKS”
For at least 40 years, economists have been
trying to develop a quantitative characterization
of FOMC policy actions—a policy reaction func-
tion.5 A review published in 1990 analyzed 42
published examples of attempts at characterizing
FOMC behavior.6 Since 1993, the prevalent frame-
work to quantify FOMC action is the “Taylor
rule.”7 None of these efforts have achieved their
objective.8 In my judgment, it is not possible at
the current state of knowledge to define a precise
reaction function of the FOMC, and perhaps it
never will be possible.
It is possible, however, to describe some gen-
eral principles that guide FOMC behavior and
that can be applied by market participants to form
expectations about how the FOMC will respond
to new and unexpected information. I believe
that these principles are fairly widely accepted,
but different FOMC members will apply them in
different ways at different times. And the princi-
ples always involve a degree of judgment.
The first principle is that the FOMC will not
respond to “shocks” that are seen as very transi-
tory. Policy should only react to “shocks” that
are longer lasting—highly persistent. The reason
for this principle is quite straightforward—noth-
ing that the FOMC can do will offset the impact
on the economy of a “here today, gone tomorrow”
event. While economists continue to debate
exactly how “long and variable” the response of
the economy is to a policy action, there is a con-
sensus of professional opinion that it takes at
least several months before the economy responds.
Of course, judgment is always necessary to deter-
mine whether any particular shock is likely to be
transitory.
Some transitory shocks occur because “news”
does not provide accurate information. Many
data releases are subject to several revisions, and
often the revised data reveal a different picture
than that portrayed by the initial release. Quarterly
GDP data are revised twice until the “final esti-
mates,” and these “final estimates” are subject to
annual benchmark revisions and comprehensive
revisions at roughly five-year intervals. For a
recent example of significant data revisions, initial
measurement of the 2001 recession suggested
negative real GDP growth in the second and third
quarters of 2001, whereas the currently available
data measure negative real growth as early as the
third quarter of 2000 and for the first three quar-
ters of 2001.
The monthly payroll employment data are
revised in the two months following the initial
release and are revised again at the beginning of
the following calendar year to incorporate bench-
marks to the unemployment insurance system
records. With the initial release of the payroll
employment numbers for October 2003 at the
beginning of last November, the measured
monthly increase of 126,000 workers generated
the hope that the transition from the two-year
“jobless recovery” to a period of rapid employ-
ment growth was at hand. The October data as
currently revised indicate an increase in payroll
employment of only 88,000 workers. We now
5 An early analysis is William G. Dewald and Harry G. Johnson, “An Objective Analysis of the Objectives of American Monetary Policy, 1952-61,”
in Deane Carson (ed.), Banking and Monetary Studies, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1963, pp. 171-89.
6 Salwa S. Khoury, “The Federal Reserve Reaction Function: A Specification Search,” in Thomas Meyer (ed.), The Political Economy of
American Monetary Policy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 27-50.
7 John B. Taylor, “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice,” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1993, 39(0), pp. 195-214.
8 An illustration of the deviations of the predicted from actual funds rate from a Taylor rule with a constant target inflation rate over the past
decade can be found in Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Monetary Trends, p. 10, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/mt/.
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month payroll employment growth exceed
100,000 jobs—and only an anemic 112,000 at
that.
The presence of measurement error in indi-
vidual economic data series, particularly in the
initial releases of such data, requires that analysts
and policymakers examine multiple data sources
for a consistent picture of the underlying trends
in economic activity. There is no way to generalize
about this issue. Different series have different
sources of error and different frequencies of large
revisions. Some series are more subject to special
disturbances, such as bad weather, than others.
The Federal Reserve has tremendous staff expert-
ise and access to statistical agencies that permit
it to form the best judgments possible on these
tricky issues.
As an aside, let me offer another observation.
Currently, the Federal Reserve enjoys very high
credibility. Among other benefits, that credibility
enables the Fed to react to its best judgment about
what incoming data mean. The Fed does not have
to act to maintain appearances. For example, my
impression is that there were times in the 1970s
when the Fed failed to react to accumulating evi-
dence of economic weakness for fear that to react
before inflation declined could be interpreted as
a lack of inflation-fighting resolve. Policy actions
designed primarily to attempt to affect expecta-
tions, even though contrary to the fundamentals,
ultimately increase uncertainty as it becomes
clear that the action did not fit the fundamentals.
Success in bringing down inflation and keeping
it down means that the Fed can ignore a surge in
price indices or any other troubling information
if its best judgment is that the data reflect a sta-
tistical aberration or a transitory event.
I’ve argued that the Federal Reserve must
analyze the data for potential statistical problems
and that it must do its best to sort out transitory
disturbances from longer lasting ones. Another
dimension of the problem is that a central part of
making such judgments is to collate information
from a variety of sources. Employment data pro-
vide an excellent example. The establishment
and household surveys are quite distinct statisti-
cally, as the surveys’ coverage and methods do
not overlap. Data on initial claims for unemploy-
ment insurance supplement the message from
the two main surveys. In addition, the Federal
Reserve accumulates a wealth of anecdotal infor-
mation on the labor market from contacts across
the country; much of this information appears in
the Beige Book. When data from diverse sources
point in the same direction, confidence in the
direction indicated is increased. Conversely, when
the signals are conflicting, there is often good
reason to reserve judgment and delay policy
action. Analysis of the strength of household
demand, business investment demand, inflation-
ary pressures, and all other key elements of the
picture can and does proceed the same way.
Once FOMC members have reached a con-
clusion on where the economy is and where it is
heading, there are situations where the decision
on the appropriate policy response is straightfor-
ward and other cases where the appropriate
response is problematic. Consider some examples
of easy cases first. Suppose the economy has
shown robust growth with low inflation for a
period of time, and information accumulates that
leads to a reasonable interpretation that both real
growth and inflation pressures are increasing, or
both decreasing. Faced with such information,
central bankers with a dual mandate (such as the
FOMC) are likely to respond by raising or lower-
ing, as appropriate, the nominal interest rate
target. When credibility is high, moreover, the
decision need not be a quick one. But when the
issue is clear, the central bank must act vigor-
ously enough to ensure maintenance of a non-
inflationary equilibrium.
Indeed, such responses are, qualitatively,
exactly those predicted by the Taylor rule. Under
these conditions, market participants and private
agents can likely accurately anticipate the direc-
tion, if not the timing and magnitude, of FOMC
actions. The FOMC practice since February 1994
of generally restricting changes in the intended
federal funds rate to regularly scheduled meetings
and making changes in multiples of 25 basis
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dictability of the timing and magnitude of changes
in the intended funds rate in such cases.9
The appropriate policy response in other
cases is less clear. Suppose the economy has
shown robust growth with low inflation for a
period of time and information arrives that leads
to a reasonable interpretation that real growth is
decreasing and inflation is increasing. A histori-
cal episode of this sort is the “oil shock” in late
1973 and 1974. Here, one component of a “dual
mandate” signals a policy action in one direction
and the other component in the opposite direction.
This is a dilemma case in which the behavior of
the economy is pulling the policymakers to be
both easier and tighter. A weighting of objectives
and careful attention to long-run concerns is nec-
essary. Even if a central bank were to follow a
Taylor rule approach to implementing policy
changes, in the absence of disclosure of the exact
reaction function, outside observers would be
unable to predict the policy action. It is unrealis-
tic to believe that a central bank can provide the
transparency required for outsiders to accurately
predict policy actions in all such circumstances.
Predictability in the dilemma cases can be
improved and the appropriate policy response
facilitated when a central bank has a credible
commitment to maintaining low inflation in the
long run. In these circumstances, the central bank
can likely pursue short-run stabilization objec-
tives without significant influence on expecta-
tions of long-run inflation. In current parlance,
inflationary expectations are “well anchored.” In
such environments, policy actions aimed at short-
run stabilization are likely to be more effective.
Under conditions of high credibility, policy
actions are likely more predictable.
The Federal Reserve has policy responsibili-
ties beyond a narrow interpretation of the “dual
mandate.” In particular, a fundamental responsi-
bility envisioned by the architects of the Federal
Reserve Act was that the new central banking
structure avoid recurrence of episodes of finan-
cial instability and banking panics such as those
that occurred regularly in the late 19th and early
20th century. The Great Depression was a Federal
Reserve policy failure of the first order. Recent
episodes, such as the 1987 stock market crash,
the financial market upset in the fall of 1998,
Y2K, and 9/11 provide evidence that the Federal
Reserve has learned lessons from the 1930s well
and can deal effectively with systemic threats to
financial stability.
It is important to understand, however, that
concerns about financial stability require that
the Federal Reserve sort out shocks that raise
such concerns from those that do not. Not every
large event creates risks for the financial system
as a whole. The large stock market decline that
started in early 2001 did tend to depress economic
activity but, unlike the crash of 1987, never raised
issues of systemic stability.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
Forecast uncertainty is a fact of life. Forecasts
are like newspapers. Just as last week’s newspaper
is of little value in understanding today’s news,
last month’s forecast is of little value in determin-
ing today’s policy stance. Old newspapers and
old forecasts are primarily of historical interest.
The obvious fact that we insist on using the
most up-to-date forecast available indicates that
forecasts change, sometimes substantially, with
new information. Forecasts are valuable in formu-
lating monetary policy, but it is of critical impor-
tance that we not allow today’s policy settings to
become entrenched in our minds.
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9 William Poole, Robert H. Rasche, and Daniel L. Thornton, “Market Anticipations of Monetary Policy Actions,” Federal Reserve Bank of St.
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